By Elizabeth Economy
Xi Jinping enjoyed the moment. Speaking before an annual Chinese gathering of about 3,000 delegates to the National People's Congress in Beijing during March 2021, the Chinese president celebrated the glory of victory after the epidemic, declaring that his country was the first to tame the Corona virus, the first to resume work, and the first to restore positive economic growth. He considered this to be the result of "self-confidence in our path, self-confidence in our theories, self-confidence in our system, and self-confidence in our culture". He also expressed his pride that "our youth now, when they travel abroad, can stand tall and proud, unlike when we were young." For Xi, China's success in controlling the spread of the new Corona virus is further evidence that he is on the right path, meaning that China is regaining its historical position of leadership and centrality on the world stage. A Brief Official History of the "Chinese Communist Party," published the following month, bolstered his assessment. That book claimed that Xi had brought China "closer to the center of the world stage than it has ever been. The nation has never been so close to being reborn."
In fact, China already occupies a central place in the international system. It is the world's largest trading power and the largest source of global lending, has the world's largest population and military, and has become a global center for innovation. In this context, most analysts expect that China's real GDP will exceed that of the United States by 2030, which will make it the largest economy in the world. Moreover, as demonstrated by the evolution of the epidemic, China's response to global challenges has a profound impact on the rest of the world.
Although Xi's ambition and China's global prominence have become an indisputable fact, many observers continue to question whether Beijing wants to forge a new international order or whether it will content itself with merely imposing some adjustments to the existing order, promoting unilateral interests and preferences, without Radical change in the world order. Those observers also argue that Beijing's approach is mostly defensive, designed only to protect itself from criticism of its political system while fulfilling a limited set of sovereign demands. Notably, that view fails to capture Xi's scope. The latter's understanding of Sinocentrism goes beyond ensuring that the relative weight of that country's voice or influence within the current international system is adequately represented. In fact, that understanding implies a radically changed international order.
In Xi's vision, a reunified and resurgent China will stand on par with or surpass the United States. As China [according to that vision] is the pre-eminent power in Asia, and its maritime domain has expanded to include control of disputed areas in East China and the South China Sea. Also, the United States retreated across the Pacific to take its rightful place as a power in the Atlantic. Moreover, the formidable network of US alliances that have underpinned the international order for more than 70 years is fading away in favor of a Chinese-proposed framework of dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation. In a related context, China's influence also radiates across the world through infrastructure that extends from ports, railways and bases, to fiber optic cables, electronic payment systems and satellites. In the same way that American, European, and Japanese companies led the development of the world's infrastructure in the twentieth century, Chinese companies are vying for leadership in the twenty-first century. So Xi is aptly using China's economic power to induce and compel compliance with his vision.
It should be noted that this change in the geostrategic landscape reflects and reinforces a more profound transformation, represented by the rise of a China-centric system with its own standards and values. Although the international system after World War II was not perfect, it was shaped primarily by liberal democracies that adhered in principle to universal human rights, the rule of law, free markets, and limited state intervention in the political and social lives of their citizens. In a parallel way, multilateral institutions and international law are designed to advance those values and norms, and technology has often been used to reinforce them. On the other hand, Xi seeks sudden change and the primacy of states in place of those values. It is worth noting that the institutions, laws, and technology in that new system strengthen state control, limit individual freedoms, and restrict open markets. Thus, it is a world in which the state controls the flow of information and capital within its own borders and across international borders, without any independent oversight of its power.
By the way, Chinese officials and scholars seem confident that the rest of the world supports Xi's vision, boasting that "East rises, West recedes!" However, many countries turned out to be less than impressed with Xi's bold initiatives, as the full political and economic costs of adopting the Chinese model became clear. At the National People's Congress, Xi displayed the self-confidence of a leader convinced that the world is there for China to benefit from. Conversely, his confidence may act as an impediment to acknowledging the resistance that Beijing is fueling through its actions abroad. Thus, Xi's success depends on his ability to adapt and take these negative outcomes into account. Indeed, failure to do so may lead to more miscalculations that may end the reshaping of the world order, but not in the way Xi envisions.
Reunification of the Motherland
Xi's path to a reorganized world begins with redrawing the map of China. In a speech in October 2021, he emphasized that "the historic task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be accomplished, and of course it will be accomplished." Xi's first priority is to assert sovereignty over long-disputed territories, particularly those that Beijing describes as its core interests, namely Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea.
In retrospect, Beijing has actually dealt with Hong Kong. And in 2020, China imposed a national security law on the city that effectively ended its autonomy established under the shadow of the "one country, two systems" model that was established in 1997 when Hong Kong was handed over from London to Beijing. Within months [following the imposition of the national security law], Beijing had undermined the city's longstanding commitment to basic human rights and the rule of law, turning it into just another Chinese city.
In a parallel context, Xi has made progress in asserting Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea. He established and encamped seven artificial landmarks in the sea and claimed his rights to dozens of other islands and stretches of marine land. He also deployed a more powerful Chinese navy, a newly armed coast guard, and a huge fishing fleet, with the aim of intimidating the other five countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam) with overlapping demands and asserting control in disputed waters. Throughout the pandemic, Xi has also taken advantage of the distraction of other countries to press for additional territorial claims. For more than 100 consecutive days, Chinese ships sailed in the waters off Japan and around a number of disputed islands in that area that China calls the "Diaoyu Islands" and Japan calls the "Senkaku Islands". A Chinese coast guard vessel has collided and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat, Chinese military aircraft have flown over disputed waters claimed by China and Malaysia, and China and India have entered into their first deadly border dispute in four decades.
In fact, Xi will not accept a map of China that does not reflect mainland Chinese control over Taiwan. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi declared that unity with Taiwan constituted one of the 14 items that must be accomplished to realize the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." He also stressed the importance of unifying China with effervescent images, "The people on both sides of the strait form one family, with common blood. No one can cut the veins that bind us."
By the way, Xi talks about unity with Taiwan with increasing frequency and urgency. He remains convinced that Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is advancing the independence agenda, also claiming that the island's "independence separatism" remains "the most dangerous hidden danger to national renewal." Since Tsai came to power in 2016, Xi has broken off the long-standing cross-strait dialogue. It also drastically reduced the number of mainland [China] tourists allowed to travel to Taiwan, from 4.2 million in 2015 to 2.7 million in 2017, which contributed to the island's annual tourism revenue dropping from $44.5 billion to $24.4 billion. In addition, he persuaded seven states out of the remaining 22 states that officially recognize Taiwan as the "Republic of China" to give up Taipei for Beijing, and to prevent Taiwan from falling into the "WHO" instructions session in the first months of the epidemic. During Tsai's 2020 re-election campaign, CPC hackers allegedly also spread disinformation aimed at undermining the campaign. In a parallel fashion, Beijing's increasingly launched military exercises along the Taiwanese coast have sparked frequent talk of a possible Chinese military attack.
On the other hand, Xi's efforts to intimidate Taiwan failed to convince the island to accept unification. Instead, it created a backlash inside and outside Taiwan. In fact, the share of Taiwanese who support independence is greater than ever, at 64 percent, and few Taiwanese retain faith that the "one country, two systems" framework can ever work, especially in the wake of the Hong Kong crackdown. Kong. An increasing number of countries have also come forward to provide support to Taiwan. In an unprecedented policy shift, Japan confirmed in 2021 that it has a direct interest in ensuring that Taiwan's status as a democracy is maintained. Also, a number of small European countries joined in the diplomatic defense of Taiwan. The Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia welcomed the visit of the Taiwanese Foreign Minister. In return, the United States supported a wide range of new legislation and diplomatic activity, designed to strengthen bilateral relations and integrate Taiwan into regional and international organizations.
Farewell to the American role
China is also preoccupied with trying to lay the foundations within its country, with the aim of replacing the United States as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. China's leaders have called the Asia-Pacific region a "big family" and claimed that "the region cannot prosper without China" and "China cannot develop in isolation from the region", and they portrayed the Asia-Pacific region as seamlessly integrated through trade Technology, infrastructure and common cultural and civilizational ties supported by China. In a related context, Xi has particularly succeeded in consolidating China's position as a regional economic leader. China is the largest trading partner of almost all Asian countries. In 2021, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations were jointly ranked as China's best trading partner. At the end of 2020, Xi completed the negotiations on the China-led "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership," which includes China, 10 Southeast Asian countries, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. In a bold maneuver, Xi also pushed China into the Comprehensive and Advanced Trans-Pacific Partnership, a Japan-led free trade agreement. This would make China the dominant economic player in the two most important regional trade agreements in the world's most economically dynamic region. While the United States will remain marginalized.
In a contrast, China has had less success in its efforts to position itself as the pre-eminent security actor in the region, a role the United States has long played. In 2014, Beijing proposed a new Asian security system run by Asian countries. Subsequently, the Chinese defense minister went back and forth in the Asia-Pacific region with the message that countries there "should abide by the principle that regional issues should be resolved by countries in the region through consultation." Likewise, Chinese officials have tried hard to portray US alliances as relics of the "Cold War" era, as well as as anti-Chinese.
However, Beijing's military assertiveness in the region has directly undermined its drive for leadership. In that context, a survey of Southeast Asian experts and businessmen found that less than 2 percent believed that China was a benign and benevolent power, while less than 20 percent seemed confident or very confident that China would "do the right thing." In contrast, about half of those surveyed believe that China is a "reactionary power" that aims to turn the region into its sphere of influence. (By contrast, more than two-thirds of the respondents seemed confident or very confident that Japan would "do the right thing" by contributing to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance.) Likewise, China's behavior has reinvigorated the "four-way partnership" that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and spurred the creation of a new trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Similarly, China's behavior prompted a number of European countries, including France, Germany, and the Netherlands, along with NATO, to deepen their security partnership in the Asia-Pacific region. Even Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who earlier threatened to end his country's alliance with the United States and called China a "good friend," is now working to improve the Philippines' defense ties with Washington, as he prepares to leave office.
Dragon Bite
Xi's aspiration to centralize China on the world stage through the "Belt and Road Initiative" can be beautifully portrayed. Launched in 2013, this initiative not only provides a physical manifestation of China's centrality through three land and three sea corridors that will connect China with Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, but also evokes historical memories of the "Silk Road" and China's centrality during imperial times. In its original concept, the Belt and Road Initiative was a China-led vehicle for solid infrastructure development along the Six Corridors. At present, the branches of this initiative include the so-called digital, health, and polar silk roads, noting that all countries are welcome to.
Unlike the traditional investment in infrastructure supported by institutions of the multilateral world system such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, China is a comprehensive station. They provide financing, labor and materials for their projects, in many cases bypassing time-consuming financial risk assessments, transparent and open bidding processes, and environmental and social impact assessments. It is the Chinese development model that has gone global.
In fact, the Belt and Road Initiative has placed China at the center of the international system, and its material, financial, cultural, technological and political influence has flowed to the rest of the world. It is worth noting here that it is redrawing the fine details of the world map, with new railways and bridges, fiber optic cables, "fifth generation cellular" networks, and ports capable of containing Chinese military bases. According to one assessment, the "Belt and Road Initiative" now affects more than 60 countries and has exceeded $200 billion in Chinese investment. The initiative is also transforming countries, such as Pakistan, through energy projects, new roads, massive upgrades to the Gwadar port, and digital infrastructure in Pakistan. On the other hand, others were affected in a limited but very positive way. For example, the Chinese investment in the Greek port of Piraeus made it one of the best ports in Europe and among the 50 best ports in the world. In this context, Brazilian officials and researchers are excited about the possibility of the Belt and Road Initiative not only developing infrastructure projects in their country, but also promoting innovation and sustainability efforts.
Complementary, Xi also envisioned the "Belt and Road Initiative" as a channel through which China could transmit its political and cultural values. In an important speech in October 2017, Xi presented China's development model as one worth emulating, and Beijing is now offering a wide range of political training programmes. In that context, Tanzania, which it considers the "Belt and Road Initiative" a country that serves as a model for building political capabilities in the Chinese way, [Tanzania has developed] a law on cybersecurity that is similar to its legal counterpart in China. Tanzania has worked with Beijing to restrict social media and the flow of information online. In a parallel fashion, the governments of other countries, such as Uganda, have expressed a strong desire to receive Chinese technology and training in order to help them monitor and track down political opposition figures.
Similarly, political parties in Ethiopia, South Africa, and Sudan participated in CPC training on party structure, people-to-people relations, and China's propaganda media system. It is worth noting that China's "Digital Silk Road", which includes submarine cables, electronic payment systems, surveillance technologies, "5G" networks, in addition to other digital communication technologies, is of particular value as a means of transmitting Chinese political and cultural values. For example, in Kenya, Beijing not only provided satellite television to more than 10,000 people, but also tens of thousands of hours of Chinese programmes. In fact, the airwaves in Kenya, as well as those in other parts of Africa, are filled with martial arts films, dramas about life in China, and documentaries promoting the Chinese Communist Party's political narrative, such as those focusing on Japanese atrocities in World War I The second, noting that it was dubbed into local languages.
However, the Belt and Road Initiative is becoming increasingly bumpy. In exchange for its ability to provide the benefits of China's infrastructure-heavy development model, it also carries with it all of its additional factors that include high levels of debt, corruption, environmental pollution and deterioration, and poor labor practices. So, popular protests spread throughout the host countries. In Kazakhstan, citizens have repeatedly demonstrated against Chinese mining projects and factories that pollute the environment and use Chinese labor instead of local labor. Similar protests erupted in Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and Zambia. Also, other countries, including Cameroon, Indonesia, Kenya and Pakistan, have reported corruption problems in the Belt and Road Initiative projects. In addition, some countries, such as Azerbaijan and Mongolia, no longer expect EITI projects to generate more gains than they cost. As a result, several countries have halted or canceled their projects entirely. And by extension, of the 52 coal-fired power plants slated to be developed through the Belt and Road Initiative between 2014 and 2020, 25 have been suspended and another eight have been cancelled. (China's commitment in September 2021 not to build new coal-fired power projects abroad indicates that a number of projects that have been suspended will eventually be cancelled.) In a related context, a study conducted in 2018 found that 270 projects out of 1,814 projects within the “Belt and Road Initiative” that have been implemented effectively since 2013 have encountered management difficulties, and these stalled cases accounted for 32 percent of the total value of projects.
Thus, Beijing itself may reconsider its commitments to the Belt and Road Initiative. In that area, investment levels have fallen steadily since 2016, and some of the supposed political benefits have not materialized. For example, a review of the top ten recipients of Belt and Road investment reveals that there is no direct relationship between levels of investment and state support for China on sensitive issues such as Hong Kong and the South China Sea and Chinese actions in Xinjiang. Similar to the assertiveness shown by China regarding its borders, the Belt and Road Initiative has sparked a backlash. It has led to competitive initiatives by Japan and other countries to fund infrastructure and support it with higher standards and more benefits for the local workforce.
On the other hand, other efforts to enhance Chinese cultural influence also face difficulties. For example, Xi has spearheaded efforts to devote Chinese language and cultural performances by establishing "Confucius Institutes" in universities and classrooms abroad. For a number of educational institutions, Beijing's financial support for these institutes was necessary for them to be able to offer Chinese language training. As a result, it has spread rapidly. However, over time, the initiative's more coercive nature undermined its early success. In 2011, Li Changchun, then a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Politburo, stated, "As an attractive brand for expanding our culture abroad, the 'Confucius Institute' has made an important contribution to improving our soft power.
In fact, the brand "Confucius" has a natural charm. By using the argument of teaching Chinese, everything makes sense.” According to Beijing's requirements, contracts between local academic institutions and "Confucius Institutes" were kept secret, and teachers and curricula were determined by Beijing, a privilege most Chinese academies would not offer to anyone. In addition, a few of those institutes attempted to shape broader university policies around issues related to China, such as their warning against hosting the Dalai Lama.As scholars and politicians in Canada, Sweden, the United States, and elsewhere began to question the integrity of the project, the institutes' appeal waned. .
By 2020, China had established just over half of the 1,000 "Confucius Institutes" it hoped to establish. The impact of these institutes as a source of soft power appears to be limited. In Africa, where China has set up 61 "Confucius Institutes," a survey revealed that 71 percent of citizens think English is the most important language for the next generation to learn. And 14 percent chose the French language, while only 2 percent chose the Chinese language. And in Kazakhstan, where the former prime minister's daughter has vocally advocated for China and studying in Chinese, a public opinion poll conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank revealed that one in six Kazakhs viewed China as a "friendly country."
It should be noted that initiatives such as the “Belt and Road Initiative” and the “Confucius Institutes” offer an attractive vision of Chinese centralism that has been somewhat undermined by unattractive Chinese governance practices, and a large part of Beijing’s efforts to promote Chinese centralism relied on Coercion, frankly. For example, China's pandemic diplomacy has highlighted the coercive nature of Chinese efforts to shape the world around it. In a related context, the Chinese “wolf warrior” diplomats [a designation used to refer to a policy pursued by Chinese diplomats who consider themselves a fighter dedicated to the benefit of the Chinese Communist Party and against its enemies] have used the issue of producing “personal protective equipment” [used by medical personnel during the confrontation Corona like gloves, nylon coats, headscarves, and masks] as a weapon, by threatening to cut off supplies to countries that criticize China. They also launched an attack aimed at spreading misinformation about the origins of the virus to divert attention from Chinese guilt. When Australia called for an investigation into the origins of the virus, Beijing imposed restrictions and tariffs on some of Australia's most popular exports.
It is worth noting here that China's use of its economic clout to coerce international actors is well known and has been happening for a long time. For example, Beijing has threatened international airlines, retail trade, movies and hotels with serious financial repercussions if it does not acknowledge in its published materials the Chinese sovereign claims regarding Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea. And in the wake of a now-famous tweet by then-general manager of the Houston Rockets basketball team Daryl Morey in support of the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, Chinese stores pulled Rockets-branded products from their shelves, and China Central Television stopped broadcasting NBA basketball games. In this regard, China Central Television announced, "We believe that any statements that challenge national sovereignty and social stability do not fall within the scope of freedom of expression." Beijing has effectively signaled that it believes it has the right to control the speech of anyone, anywhere in the world. Shortly thereafter, Beijing expelled several Wall Street Journal reporters in response to an opinion piece in the paper with a headline describing China as the "sick man of Asia." Perhaps as an indication of how such policies might evolve, a government office in Beijing suggested in 2020 that any criticism of traditional Chinese medicine, which is one of Xi's personal interests, should be deemed illegal.
And by extension, Chinese coercion is most effective in shaping the behavior of individual actors. On the other hand, several multinational companies succumb to Chinese pressure in the end and adjust the way they conduct their business. Some of them try to quietly maintain their principles, even if they appear to defer to Chinese demands. In the aviation sector, for example, some airlines have removed Taiwan from their websites, but still set it apart from mainland China and set ticket prices in Taiwan instead of the Chinese yuan. It is also significant that China has failed miserably in its attempts to use its economic clout to force countries such as the Philippines and South Korea, among others, to change their policies on issues such as competition in the South China Sea and the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Missile Defense (= THAAD, for short). for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] made in the United States. Beijing also failed in its efforts to disrupt Canadian judicial proceedings related to the detention of Meng Wanzhou, chief financial officer of the Chinese telecoms group Huawei, by imprisoning two Canadian citizens as political leverage. In the end, Ming spent nearly three years under house arrest before her case was settled.
Tight control
China's centrality in the global arena stems largely from its economic potential, ie its position as an engine of growth and global trade and the opportunity it provides for other countries to access its vast markets. Despite this, Xi's initiatives increasingly raise questions about how China's economy will interact with the rest of the world. Indeed, his tenure was marked by a series of policies, such as "Made in China 2025," that consolidate government control and insulate the Chinese economy from outside competition. In 2020, Xi formulated an economic model of "dual circulation", envisioning China as a country largely self-sufficient and capable of innovating, manufacturing and consuming, all within its own economy. In a parallel way, China will continue to engage with the international economy through exports, vital supply chains, and limited imports of capital and know-how. Within China, Xi has significantly consolidated the CCP's control over Chinese firms' decision-making power.
Thus, these moves, away from openness and economic reform on a larger level, led to the emergence of a new set of problems in Beijing's relations with the rest of the world. Many countries have lost faith in the independence of Chinese companies from the government and are now working to narrow Chinese companies' access to their markets and increase export controls on sensitive technologies for Chinese companies. Beijing's forced use of personal protective equipment early in the pandemic also raised alarm bells about dependence on Chinese supply chains, prompting countries to encourage their companies to go home or move to friendlier locations. On the other hand, the Chinese economy's appeal remains strong as a market and a leader in global trade and investment, but Xi's policies reduce, rather than enhance, the kind of stability and predictability that economic actors desire when they think about where to invest time and capital, and thus This raises a new set of challenges to Xi's Sinocentric vision.
Complementary, Xi also seeks to exercise greater control over the existing international architecture of global institutions. In that context, he explicitly and repeatedly called on China to lead the reform of the global governance system, and to change the values and norms on which the international system is based to align with those of China. He also argued, along with other Chinese officials, that the current rules-based world order [internationally agreed upon, especially since the end of World War II], does not adequately reflect the voice of China or that of the developing world. Instead, that system [according to Xi] was created and sustained to work for a small number of liberal democracies. Notably, Xi wants the values and norms in those international institutions to reflect Chinese preferences instead, such as elevating the right to development to be more important than individual political and civil rights, and setting technical standards that allow the state to control the flow of information. .
It should be noted that China's approach is both tactical and strategic. Chinese officials are prepared to assert Chinese national interests even if they conflict with the interests of the international institutions in which they work. For example, in 2020, the Twitter account of the International Civil Aviation Organization was blocked for users who support Taiwan's membership in that organization. In another example, Dolkun Isa, one of the most important Uighur activists in the world, was prevented from speaking before the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2017. In that context, the Chinese official who holds the position of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs appeared, Wu Hongbo, on Chinese television to later claim responsibility for preventing Issa's appearance, stating that "we must vigorously defend the interests of the motherland." Similarly, the French newspaper Le Monde reported in 2019 that Beijing threatened to block agricultural exports from Brazil and Uruguay if they did not support the Chinese candidate for the position of director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
In a similar vein, Xi is committed to a long-term strategy of transforming broader global rules in areas such as internet governance, human rights, and technical standards, in ways that increase state control over individual rights and freedoms. In each of these areas, China sought to secure leadership positions for Chinese officials or other friendly actors in relevant institutions and supporting committees, and flooded the meetings with large numbers of Chinese participants. In addition, China has poured financial resources into attempts to determine agendas and outcomes of political debates. Over time, the strategy paid off. In this regard, the Chinese proposals, which call for, for example, state control over the flow of information to every device connected to the network, are under development and study at the United Nations.
Moreover, Xi indicated his intention to take the lead in developing standards in areas where the establishment process has not yet been fully completed, such as aerospace, maritime space, and the Arctic. In the Arctic, Xi has moved aggressively to try to strengthen China's role in determining the region's future. Despite China being 900 miles from the Arctic Circle, it has provided training and financial support to thousands of Chinese researchers on Arctic-related topics, supported joint research and exploration with Arctic countries, built a fleet of modern icebreakers, and funded research stations in a number of countries. countries of that region. Of the Arctic Council observer countries, China is overwhelmingly active, hosting scientific conferences, presenting papers for review, and volunteering to serve on science committees. In that framework, Xi has attempted to assert China's rights in decision-making around the Arctic by referring to China as a "near-Arctic power" and reframing the Arctic as a global common cause, entailing negotiations among a wide range of countries.
On the other hand, as with other areas of Chinese foreign policy, it appeared that there was a price for that insistence. Although China has come a long way in involving itself in developing standards around the Arctic, it has begun to lose ground as Arctic nations become less inclined to accept Chinese investment due to concerns about potential security risks.
In a parallel way, Xi's more proactive approach has sparked a new interest among a number of countries in strengthening the existing rules-based international order. Thus, for example, a group of countries have come together to prevent UN agencies and programs from automatically supporting the inclusion of the Belt and Road Initiative in their mission statements or initiatives. It is also moving to drum up support for candidates for leadership in UN agencies and other multilateral institutions who can provide a strong commitment to openness, transparency, and the rule of law. Moreover, they are drawing attention to cases where China appears to be inappropriately influencing or undermining best practices, such as the World Health Organization's initial reluctance to address China's lack of transparency during the first month of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sacrificing the war to win the battle
China's desire to rearrange the world order can be described as ambitious. In contrast, the leadership of the United States on the world stage, its democratic coalition system, and the post-World War II liberal international order are deeply entrenched. Despite this, Chinese officials argue that the past two centuries, when China was not dominant in the global economy, have been a historical aberration. They also claim that US leadership is declining. According to He Yafei, the former deputy foreign minister, "the end of the American peace, or the American century, is on the horizon." In a related context, Chinese leaders and many international observers have expressed confidence that Beijing is on the path to success. Shen Dingli, a renowned scholar at Fudan University, described China as occupying a "moral high" in the international community and serving as the "leading country of the new era". Likewise, Xi himself has called China's rejuvenation a "historical inevitability".
Actually, there is reason for Xi's optimism. It is clear that China has made progress in all dimensions Xi identified as essential to reform, while the United States' reputation and influence have been damaged by internal strife and a lack of leadership on the world stage.
Nonetheless, it seems just as plausible, if not more so, that China has won some battles but lost the war. So, Xi's optimistic assessment of China's epidemic response may reverberate at home, but the international community keeps vivid memories of Beijing's bullying diplomacy, coercive practices on personal protective equipment, military repression and aggression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and persistent hostility over the identification of the virus' origins. . On the other hand, Xi wants a China seen by the international community to be "credible, loved and respected," but his actions have resulted in public opinion polls showing record low levels of trust in him and little appetite for Chinese leadership. Now, various initiatives to promote Chinese centralism, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Confucius Institutes, and the Leadership in Global Governance, are stalling or slowing down, as the full economic and political costs of acquiescing to Chinese leadership become clear to the rest of the world.
And by extension, the international community might also be forgiven if it wondered what Xi wanted beyond centralization. In that regard, Xi has made it clear that he wants China to play a dominant role in defining the rules that govern the international system. Conversely, with the US retreating from global leadership during the presidency of Donald Trump, Xi has proven unwilling or unable to replace the US in leading the international community in responding to global challenges or playing the role of world policeman. China may simply wish to have the rights, but not the full responsibilities, that traditionally accrue to the world's most important power.
It should be noted that Xi's ambition to centralize China on the world stage is of little appeal to much of the rest of the world, and in the current context of growing international opposition, his direct success seems unlikely. However, if Xi realizes that his strategy is unraveling, the outcome for the international community could be just as difficult as if he succeeds. In recent months, Xi has alarmed world leaders by cracking down on Chinese tech companies that operate globally, wiping out the last vestiges of democracy in Hong Kong, and flexing China's military muscle with a hypersonic missile test. Likewise, there is a high possibility of further destabilizing measures, such as the use of force to unite with Taiwan. In fact, Xi has not outlined a peaceful path forward for union with the island nation, and he has already shown a willingness to engage in risky military behavior in the East China and South China Seas, as well as on the border with India.
Facing major international headwinds, Xi's response has been to raise the stakes. Thus, he seems unwilling to moderate his ambition, except in areas where his core political and strategic priorities are not at risk, such as climate change. Thus, the optimal outcome for Xi, though still unlikely, would be to engage in a series of persistent and inexpressive domestic compromises, such as the demand for regional economic leadership as the price of backing down from military aggression in the region, and the pride of stopping the spread of Corona. On the one hand, while acknowledging the weak innovation of the Chinese vaccine on the other hand, as well as achieving striking success in eliminating terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, the price is to start the process of liberating the “re-educated” Uyghur Muslims from concentration camps. This set of tacit domestic compromises would enable Xi to preserve the success story of China's centralization while responding to the international community's most important concerns.
It is worth noting that Xi's ability to achieve his ambition depends on the interaction of a number of factors, including on the one hand the continued vitality of the Chinese army and economy, and the support of other senior leaders and the Chinese people, while on the other hand, the possibility of the world continuing to resist Chinese coercion, and the ability of global democracies. and others in expressing their convincing vision about the future of the world and striving to achieve this vision. On the other hand, perhaps most important to Xi's success is his ability to accept and address the broad disconnect between what he wants to offer the world and what the world wants from him.