Map of forces and drivers of conflict in Taiz

  • Time:Mar 15
  • Written : smartwearsonline
  • Category:Article
“The Street” - Khalil Al-Zakri:

Taiz governorate has acquired exceptional importance in the map of the Yemeni conflict, due to its key location, which makes it a vital transportation node between the northern and southern governorates, and its direct view of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In addition to the political symbolism that the governorate enjoys as an active focus of the intellectual and partisan movement, which made it difficult to classify, and later turned it into a complex arena of conflict that greatly intensified the contradictions and intertwining of the Yemeni crisis.

key players

And there are three main forces in Taiz (the Islah party, the Houthi group, and the National Resistance) that shared geopolitical control over the governorate due to its armed arms. In addition to this trio, there are some components and political and civil activities that seek to influence the course of events, in addition to the forces of the Transitional Council that are stationed in some of the southwestern districts of the governorate, and despite their military influence, they have so far refused to play a proactive political role in the governorate, committed to its southern borders.

The Iranian-backed Houthi militia is in control of large parts of the east and north of the city (the districts of Sharaab Al-Runah, Sharaab Al-Salam, Maqbana, Al-Taziah, and Mawiyah) and parts of the west of the governorate (in the districts of Maqbana and Jabal Habashi), in addition to the districts of Haifan and Dimna Khadir in The southeastern countryside of the governorate, and imposed a stifling siege on the city, which no longer breathes except through one artery linking it to the capital, Aden.

On the other hand, the forces of Tareq Saleh (National Resistance), supported by the UAE, and operating within the joint forces, are stationed in the districts of the governorate on the western coast, with some southern units shared with them in the districts of Mawza’ and Al-Wazi’iyah, which are close to the coastal districts of Mocha and Dhu Bab.

As for the Islah Party (the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen), it imposes complete control, especially from a military and security point of view, on the rest of the governorate (and under the guise of legitimacy), as its militias and forces loyal to it are located in the center and west of the city and large parts of the neighborhoods southeast of the city, and the old city that was The forces of the Salafist leader known as “Abu al-Abbas” are stationed there, and he was expelled from it on accusations that he is loyal to the Emirates. Then, “Islah” expanded its full control over the directorates of the southern countryside of Taiz known as “Al-Hujariya”, after the assassination of Brigadier General Adnan Al-Hammadi, commander of the 35th Armored Brigade in The end of 2019, and the invasion of the region months later, with large forces accused of being funded by Qatar and Turkey, in particular what is known as the “Popular Mobilization” militia, which was founded by Brotherhood leader Hammoud Saeed Al-Mikhlafi, and under the supervision of the Taiz military axis. With the aim of controlling “Al-Hijriya” and expanding towards the western coast, and the southern regions.

Expanding influence and tightening control

Since mid-2017, the government forces in Taiz have not engaged in any real military operation against the Houthi militia, specifically after the Islah party began to control the joints of the military and security institutions, and made many changes in the army and security, by removing leaders believed to be hostile to it and enabling Incompetent elements, and combat operations continued to range between hit and run in the vicinity of Tabat al-Silal on the eastern front and the northern front of the city.

Al-Islah also formed many military units without republican decisions, and limited the theater of their operations away from the leadership of the Fourth Region, within whose scope Taiz falls, and entrusted its leadership to its elements from outside the army, which declared its allegiance to legitimacy. He also assigned the tasks of commanding the battalions in the units affiliated with the Taiz military axis to the sons of the leaders of the axis, people with “priorities” and wanted persons and some “escaped” from prisons, in order to facilitate the process of controlling them and directing them to implement its plans and agendas in the governorate, according to observers, and among these units is the “Brigade.” The fourth is mountainous infantry, which clearly revealed the direction of my “brothers” to take control of Al-Hujjariya at the expense of the 35th Armored Brigade, which Al-Islah classified as at the top of the list of obstacles that limit the expansion of its influence and control.

After the invasion of “Al-Hujariya” on August 22, 2020, the Islah party deployed hundreds of its gunmen and forces loyal to it in the theater of operations of the 35th Armored Brigade, and took control of the strategic heights in the region, which overlook the southern regions. He also tried to expand in the Al-Sabiha areas, specifically in the district of Tur Al Baha, and formed a military axis in it without an official announced decision, and entrusted his leadership to a party member called Abu Bakr al-Jaboli, who worked as a teacher. of the people of the region and their inclusion in the forces of the new axis. To this day, Islah is still trying to create potential lines of confrontation with its archenemy, the Southern Transitional Council in the region. However, the Riyadh Agreement curbs all its plans and ambitions, especially towards the south until this moment, as observers confirm.

Change the course of the conflict

Observers say that the Islah party covers its movements and quest to expand its influence with the cover of “legitimacy” backed by a huge “media machine” local as well as external linked to the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to its harnessing of the official media, including channels, newspapers, and websites, to justify its orientations and movements, and to show that it is in The context of the battle to restore the state and confront the Houthis, and attack any voice that is different and opposed to these movements.

Observers point out that many of the senior leaders of the Congress Party, affiliated with Taiz, support the Islah Party in its orientations and disregard everything it plans, after ensuring that it continues its interests and some of the privileges it enjoyed during the era of the previous regime. Among these leaders is Rashad Al-Alimi, who is the advisor to the President of the Republic, the current governor of the province, Nabil Shamsan, the former governor of Ali Al-Maamari, Sultan Al-Barakani, the current speaker of the outgoing House of Representatives, and the member of the House of Representatives, Muhammad Muqbil Al-Hamiri, and other local leaders associated with them, most notably the governorate’s deputy, Aref Jamil. , In addition to some of the leaders of other parties in the province. This gave the Islah party a “cover” to move freely in Taiz, as they see it.

Since the assassination of Al-Hammadi, and the previous smear campaigns adopted by Islah party activists against him, and the control of the operations of the 35th Brigade that he was leading, in terms of empowering the militias affiliated with the party, analysts confirm that the orientations of “Reform” are now limited to expansion in the west and positioning in preparation for advancing south, pointing out To the party forgetting the “great and existential battle” against the Houthi group. This is what was revealed by the last operation launched by the Taiz axis, during which it moved on two axes: the first from the west, in the areas of Maqbna, and al-Kadha in al-Ma’afer and Jabal Habashi, all of which are areas overlooking the western coast. While the second was to the south and focused on the areas of Haifan in Al-Ahkom and Al-Aboos, all of which overlook the areas of the southern Lahij governorate. The operation was under the cover of completing the liberation of the governorate from the “Houthi militia,” which is the general project around which the forces supporting the “legitimacy of Yemen” in Taiz gathered.

Many military experts are of the view that the battle with the Houthis and the liberation of Taiz from their control takes different paths from what the axis and the Islah party took, who harnessed all the capabilities and resources of the governorate in a way that violates the law and is dominated by corruption and looting of public money for this process, which according to these experts “serves only schemes.” Islah’s ambitions to expand its influence,” during which many fighters and capabilities were wasted. They emphasized that if the operation had gone by two different paths: the first from the direction of eastern Sabr and Dimna Khadir and As-Silw districts, reaching Al-Rahda, southeast of Taiz, and cutting the Houthi supply line to Haifan, and the second: by penetrating the Al-Rubaie area to reach Al-Sittin and cutting the Houthi supply lines to Maqbna, which was It will fall with him automatically.” And with the constant pressure, the forces would have made accelerated progress and the two paths could meet at one point, which is the direction towards the Hawban area, but the calculations of reform, according to analysts, were going to other options that did not mean the liberation battle in anything, as much as “his plans.” And his agendas are towards the west and south coast.”

Civilian forces with a narrow margin

The war confiscated the political sphere on all political and civil forces, and with the liberation of parts of the governorate center and some of its directorates, these forces began to move in an attempt to contribute to the normalization of the situation and the restoration of state institutions, but, as civil leaders and activists assert, they collided with the Islah party’s takeover of all joints of the state’s civil and military institutions , and “his evasion of many benefits that strengthen political partnership,” and these forces received many accusations of treason simply because they demanded fundamental reforms in the civil and military administrative apparatus, in terms of strengthening the presence of the state and eliminating the imbalances and manifestations of corruption practiced by the governorate’s civil and military leaders, as they put it. .

Recently, political blocs comprising civil forces, led by the Socialist and Nasserist parties, and a current from the Congress party "anti-"reform domination"" have emerged, along with civil society organizations. This bloc organized a mass demonstration under the name "Enough" movement, calling for real changes in the structure The local authority, the army, the security, and the mobilization of resources towards completing the liberation battles. And this variable created a new equation on the basis of "3 + 1". However, these forces are still moving in a narrow margin of maneuver, and they cannot, as analysts point out, become a major player in the ongoing conflict in the foreseeable future.

Source/ South24
Street alalsharaEmailSeptember 3, 2021 5 minutes Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Pinterest Skype WhatsApp Telegram Viber via mail Print Show more Share on Facebook Twitter Linkedin Pinterest Skype WhatsApp Telegram Viber via mail Print

خارطة القوى ومحركات الصراع في تعز