The Iranian nuclear file 2021-2022

Written by Mahmoud Al-Bazi, a researcher specializing in Iranian affairs

This paper presents a multidimensional analysis of the maximum pressure strategy that President Trump has publicly adopted against Tehran. It also discusses the reasons that made Tehran hesitate to return to the Vienna negotiations after Raisi came to power. Finally, the struggle of visions about the Iranian nuclear strategy in the Iranian interior is raised.

Tehran is preparing itself to return to the Vienna negotiations, and this means the desire of Tehran and the United States to return to the diplomatic track to resolve the differences of the Iranian nuclear file. These negotiations will not be easy, given the change in the level of the Iranian negotiating team, on the one hand, and Washington's continued imposition of sanctions on Tehran, on the other hand. Ali Bagheri Kani, the Iranian assistant foreign minister who is expected to head his country's delegation in Vienna, will reflect a new practical vision that Iran is adopting today, which is negotiation in order to obtain practical results quickly. On the other hand, it seems that President Biden has not yet abandoned the policy of maximum pressure against Tehran, and in the absence of the desire and ability for a military solution, Biden is counting on this strategy in the event that negotiations with Tehran fail.

This paper proposes three hypotheses. The first: Trump's strategy against Tehran did not achieve the desired results. Rather, this strategy showed counterproductive results in the security and economic aspects and the political structure in Tehran. Second: Tehran's reluctance to return to the Vienna negotiations stems from the lack of guarantees of non-withdrawal and the imposition of UN sanctions again, in addition to a difference in views on the concept of the complete lifting of sanctions and the mechanism for verifying the lifting of sanctions in practice. Third: After the failure of Rouhani's theory based on making many nuclear concessions to obtain economic privileges, Tehran is heading to the Vienna negotiations and it adopts the theory of high enrichment (60% and more) to obtain more concessions with the condition of the process. The failure of the Vienna negotiations will push Tehran towards the deterrence theory. effective, which will include it in the club of nuclear states. Based on the foregoing, we have divided our research into three main axes that we will discuss successively.

1. Maximum pressure policy and counterproductive results

Since its withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the United States has imposed more than 1,733 types of sanctions (1) targeting the oil sector, banks, individuals, and the air sector. There is much disagreement about the extent to which these sanctions include the humanitarian aspect and humanitarian aid. The United States claims that this sector is not covered by the sanctions, but a report by the Congressional Research Center shows that this provision is not fully complied with. The report notes: “In February 2020, the Treasury Department clarified that CBI accounts abroad can be used for humanitarian purchases without the risk of US sanctions, and that donations can go to Iranians from US donors. Steps fell short of steps taken in previous natural disasters as the administration provided a 90-day general license for sales to Iran. On the other hand, the Trump administration has succeeded in persuading other members of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund to stop approving a $5 billion loan requested by Iran for its response to the Corona pandemic (2).

These sanctions come under the name of “maximum pressure” to force Tehran to renegotiate the nuclear agreement and other files such as its missile program and regional intervention. Despite the strong impact of these sanctions on the economic side, these sanctions have backfired on the political and security side.

Robert Malley, in turn, acknowledged the failure of the policy of maximum pressure, and said: “The Trump administration's move led to more troubles than to calm tensions. The American people have the right to be outraged by the fact that a policy designed to keep America safe by killing Qassem Soleimani and imposing a maximum pressure campaign has the result, three years later, that America is less safe because Iran has a more extensive nuclear program and has accelerated and intensified its regional activities” (3). ).

Despite its criticism of this policy against Iran, the Biden administration has continued to implement sanctions against Iran and has not eased its impact over the past months. The following is an assessment of this policy and its impact on various Iranian aspects.

1.1. The political side

It cannot be said that President Trump's maximum pressure policy against Iran has achieved its objectives in terms of the country's political structure. Until the end of his days, it was not clear whether Trump's strategy towards Iran was based on an attempt to overthrow the regime, or whether it aimed to pressure him to make concessions on controversial issues. But what is clear from the 12 conditions set by Pompeo, Trump's secretary of state, the regular meetings that John Bolton, Trump's then advisor, held with Iranian opposition groups, and the repeated statements that the Islamic Republic is on its way to falling, shows that the sanctions policy was aimed at dismantling Iran. Legitimacy from the ruling political class and push the people to the streets to overthrow the regime. However, it does not seem that any of these goals have been achieved, and it seems that the impact was reflected only on the ruling structure and the personalities that control the joints of government in Iran.

Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign has not had the desired impact on Iranian public opinion or policy, says Nancy Gallagher, director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM) who oversees polling on Iran. The number of respondents describing economic conditions as “very bad” dropped from 45 percent shortly before the US withdrawal to 40 percent by October of the following year. As Trump tightened the screws with sanctions, public opposition to concessions intensified. For example, in May 2017, 69% of Iranians said their country should not agree to halt uranium enrichment to avoid re-imposition of US sanctions. By August 2019, 75 percent said: Iran should not give up enrichment to ease sanctions (4).

These policies were clearly and explicitly reflected in the 2021 presidential elections, as Tehran's internal and popular behavior changed in favor of the conservative movement. The validity of only 7 candidates was supported, and the Guardian Council revoked the validity of many figures affiliated with the regime, such as Ali Larijani, Eshaq Jahangiri and Ahmadinejad, the former Iranian president. It is believed that Raisi's victory was almost inevitable even for big names from the reformists or names affiliated with the regime, due to the reformists' separation from their electoral bases and their evasion of the responsibility of supporting the Rouhani government, which was not active in its second round and did not show a desire to move in order to get out of the impasse.

Iranians are more interested in the ability of presidential candidates to improve the economy than in their ideology(5).

The reasons that provided support to my boss can be summarized as follows:

The Iranian Ministry of Interior says: 28,933,400 people voted in the thirteenth presidential election, and Ebrahim Raisi won the elections with 17,926,345 votes. It was previously announced that 59,310,307 people are eligible to vote in Iran, and according to the number announced by the Ministry of Interior, the turnout in this electoral period is 48.8%, which is the lowest turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic elections (6).

The low No is due to the wide response to powers by the Guardian Council, in addition to the spread of the Corona pandemic. It is noticeable in these elections that the violators of government policies decided to object within the framework of the system itself without deviating from it.

The invalid votes ranked second after Raisi, as three million and 700 thousand votes were registered as invalid votes, which is more than the votes of other candidates, and it is the highest number and percentage of invalid votes in the history of the presidential elections since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (7).

The impact of the sanctions was not limited to the emergence of the conservative movement in the presidential elections, but also affected the Shura Council and city council elections. Trump’s rejection of the nuclear deal dealt a blow to Rouhani’s support (behind which the moderate movement and the reformists lined up), and a University of Maryland poll indicates that Rouhani’s approval rating decreased from 89 percent immediately after the signing of the agreement to 36 percent after a year of “pressure.” Al-Aqsa” (8).

Moderate politicians with reformist leanings who favor a more conciliatory foreign policy and engagement with the West have lost credibility. Popular support for conservatives such as Raisi and his movement, who claim to defend the ideals of the 1979 revolution, has risen. The “security” third power bloc, who want to increase the IRGC’s control over security, economic and foreign affairs, has also seen increasing public support for their favored policies by October 2019. (9).

Historically, the elections for the fifth session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, in which more than 71% of those eligible to vote participated, was the highest percentage of its kind. In those elections, there were 34 million and 763 thousand people eligible to vote, and the total number of votes was approximately 24 million and 682 thousand votes, and the fifth parliamentary elections were held in March 1996.

On the other hand, the lowest percentage in the Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly elections is related to the seventh term. These elections were held on February 22, 2004. The voter turnout in these parliamentary elections reached 51%, 26 million voters, out of a total of 46 million and 350 thousand eligible voters, who voted in the elections (10).

The elections for the eleventh session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly on February 21, 2020, a total of 24 million 512 thousand and 404 (48% women and 52% men) participated in the elections, and 57 million 918 thousand and 159 were eligible to vote. The voter turnout was 42.57% of eligible voters, which was the lowest percentage compared to the previous rounds. It must be noted that two days before the elections, it was announced that there were cases of coronavirus in the country.

The political orientation of the members of the eleventh House of Representatives is as follows: 221 conservative deputies, about 19 reformists and moderates, 34 independents, 11 in the second round (the conservatives won 8 constituencies), and 5 religious minorities. In these elections, the Conservatives succeeded in obtaining a special majority of more than three-quarters of the seats, which is not witnessed in Parliament so far#a11.

With regard to the city councils, the fundamentalists were able to control the city councils in most of the Iranian provinces, and perhaps the most important of these councils is the city council of Tehran. The list of fundamentalists was able to fully control the council in light of the emergence of names such as Mahdi Chamran and the daughter of Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, who became one of the fundamentalist political faces in Iran.

The regime views unifying ranks in state institutions as the only way to confront US sanctions and the policy of maximum pressure. Unifying the political and economic decision may push the country out of the impasse it is in. This process is based on the minimum democratic tools available in the Islamic Republic, and the regime aims through this process to unify the voice emerging from Tehran towards the West and to get rid of the reformist gate that is flexible in dialogue and negotiation.

Today, the “disruptive student” controls all aspects of government in Iran, from the Shura Council to the judiciary, to city councils, to the Presidency of the Republic. Therefore, coordination has become a duty between these governmental joints, and there is no longer a conflict of factions that causes delay. It seems that this current, led by Raisi, has succeeded in overcoming the most difficult test, which is the Corona test. Vaccination has doubled in the past few days compared to the last days of Rouhani's administration, reaching more than 1,100,000 doses per day. Vaccine registration also increased from 130,000 doses to more than 500,000. On the other hand, while a total of 26.6 million vaccines were imported into the country within 7 months of Rouhani's government, in two weeks of Raisi's receipt, more than 18 million doses of coronavirus vaccines were imported into the country (12).

It seems that Iran is on its way to achieving the desired goal of vaccination, which is to vaccinate nearly 60 million people, and these promises may be fulfilled within a few weeks. This vaccination campaign contributed to reducing the number of deaths from more than 600 people in August to nearly 200 people in October. Some criticize the Rouhani government for claiming that the lack of approval of the FATF is the reason preventing the import of vaccines (13).

On the other hand, the Student Opinion Center (ISPA) said: 53.2% of the respondents believe that the performance of Prime Minister Raisi's government will be better than that of the previous government, and 9.6% said that it will lead to worse. 21% believe that there is no difference between the two governments. According to the results of the survey, people have a high hope of public vaccination by February and a lower hope of the promise of lifting sanctions and controlling inflation. The percentage of people who believe that the promises made by Raisi's government will be fulfilled are as follows:

- All people vaccinated as of February: 70.8%

- Seriously fighting corruption: 58%.

- Solving the problems of the deprived regions of the country such as Sistan and Baluchestan and Khuzestan: 55.9%.

- Production boom and job creation: 52.3%.

- One million homes built annually: 47.7%.

- Inflation control: 39.9%.

- Lifting sanctions: 36.8%.

While 51.1% of people consider Raisi's popularity in society to be high, 22.2% to be low, and 16.3% to be moderate (14).

1.2. economic aspect

After the lifting of UN sanctions on Tehran, few ordinary Iranians saw economic benefits from nuclear diplomacy. In January 2018, according to a University of Maryland poll, three out of four said that “people's living conditions have not improved” as a result of the JCPOA. The vast majority believed that Iran's overall economic situation was bad (69%) and that it was getting worse (58%)(15).

Local mismanagement and corruption took much of the blame, but nearly a third still see foreign sanctions as the main problem. Nearly three-quarters of the survey's respondents said that European countries were moving more slowly than they could in trade and investment with Iran, and the vast majority cited pressure or fear of the United States as the main reason for Europe's indecisiveness, rather than Iran's weak business environment. When asked recently about European efforts to protect companies trading with Iran from US secondary sanctions, 48 ​​percent of respondents did not believe European governments were taking such steps, 26 percent called them “too little, too late,” and only 22 percent said they were helpful.

The reimposition of US sanctions has not actually increased economic pessimism. In December 2019, 73% said the economy was bad, and 56% thought it was getting worse, about the same as it was two years ago. Fifty-six percent blamed the bad economy on local mismanagement and corruption, while 39 percent blamed sanctions. This undermines the Trump administration's claim that the protests that followed the government's sudden decision to raise fuel prices (three times) show that sanctions are causing economic discontent to grow rapidly, so the Iranian regime must meet a long list of US requirements for sanctions relief, or face a popular revolution (16). .

In order to know the results of Trump's policy, one must look at the economic indicators of the Iranian economy and evaluate them.

1.2.1. oil sector

Iran is considered one of the most important countries in the field of energy in the world. It holds 27% of the global reserves of oil and gas, with 9% of the oil reserves and 18% of the natural gas reserves. The proven reserves of Iran's oil amount to 155 billion barrels, and Tehran was able, before the Trump administration's sanctions, to raise its oil production to 3.8 million barrels per day. According to OPEC, Iran’s exports reached 2.1 million barrels per day in early 2018, and these exports provided huge financial revenues that amounted to $52 billion in 2017. This figure represents almost half of the total revenues from Iranian exports, and the country’s economy depends on 60% revenues from the energy sector. Asian countries account for approximately 70% of Iranian oil imports, followed by European Union countries with 20%. China is at the forefront of Iranian oil importers, as it imported 26% of Iranian oil exports in 2017, and India came in second place with 23% (17).

The oil sector was - and still is - the sector most affected by the US sanctions. The former president, Rouhani, said in September 2020: “The total losses resulting from the sanctions imposed by the United States since 2018 amounted to $150 billion.” His deputy said in July that his country had incurred more than $100 billion in the oil sector (18). There is no accurate statistic that clearly indicates the rates of oil exports or the damage caused by the maximum pressure sanctions against Tehran, because Tehran considers these statistics secret statistics that cannot be revealed in order to preserve the ways to circumvent the sanctions that Tehran has developed since 2018. By transferring oil from ship to ship or by closing radars in international waters (19).

1.2.2. Available foreign exchange assets

In its latest report on the economic situation in the Middle East and Central Asia, the International Monetary Fund said: The available foreign exchange reserves in Iran declined from $122.5 billion in 2018 to $4 billion in 2020. The report, which was published on the website, adds According to the International Monetary Fund, April 12, that the average foreign exchange reserves available to the Islamic Republic between 2000 and 2017 amounted to about $71 billion. This figure rose to about $122.5 billion in 2018, then decreased to $12.4 billion in 2019, and finally to $4 billion in 2020 (20). The governor of the Central Bank of Iran quickly responded to this statistic, describing it as wrong.

After the central bank protested against the International Monetary Fund, the public relations of the central bank announced a few days later that the fund announced in an official email to the central bank that it had amended the previous figure for foreign exchange reserves, which amounted to 115 billion dollars (21).

This discrepancy in numbers, especially between the reports of the International Monetary Fund and the reports of the Central Bank of Iran, results from maintaining the secrecy of Iranian assets abroad and the size of cash ammunition, in order to protect them from being targeted through sanctions. But what is clear is that Iran can access only 10 percent of its foreign assets, and the IMF expected that the percentage of available reserves for 2021 would rise to approximately $12.2 billion, an increase of about $8.2 billion, and this figure for 2022 will reach approximately 21 billion dollars (22).

1.2.3. inflation

At the beginning of Rouhani's first government, in August 2013, the point inflation rate was 43.1%; But the very strong signal from the president to the people in agreement with the world and the complete lifting of sanctions caused an atmosphere of calm and stability in the economy and inflation expectations quickly fell; This led to a point inflation rate at the end of the Persian year in March 2013 at 19.5 percent. In conjunction with May 2018 and the announcement of the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the point inflation rate was at 9.7 percent; However, at the end of November 2018, the inflation rate reached 39.9% (23).

The annual household inflation rate in Iran was approximately 45.8 percent in September 2021, which shows an increase of 0.6 points compared to the same information in the previous month. The annual inflation rate for urban and rural households is 45.1% and 7.1%, respectively, and it increased by 0.6 percentage points for urban households and by 1 percentage point for rural households (24).

1.2.4. Economic growth

The average economic growth of the Rouhani government over eight years was only 1.2 percent, the lowest figure among previous governments. The average economic growth without oil in the past eight years was only 1.3 percent, which is a disaster compared to other previous governments. The average growth of the country's national income in the eight years of Rouhani's government was negative 1.8 percent(25).

1.2.5. value of the national currency

The biggest currency shock in the past four decades occurred in the government of Hassan Rouhani. The first term of Hassan Rouhani's presidency coincided with the signing of the nuclear agreement and the stability of macroeconomic indicators, a period in which the dollar was relatively stable. The exchange rate of the dollar in 2014 was about 3,200 tomans, and until the middle of 2016, the dollar’s ​​trading price in the market was less than 4,000 tomans.

But after Donald Trump took office and uncertainty increased, the dollar began to appreciate in late 2017 and early 2018. In mid-2018, the dollar hit a record high and rose to 18,000 tomans. This shock was repeated in 2020. After the price of the dollar reached 14,000 tomans at the beginning of 2020, it rose to 30,000 tomans in mid-2020, and at the end of 2020 its price reached 24,000 tomans (26). In simpler words, the rise in the value of the dollar against the Iranian riyal during President Rouhani's term has reached nearly 630 percent. This rise, of course, resulted from the pressures and sanctions that targeted all the facilities of the economy.

The policy of maximum pressure and the deterioration of economic conditions negatively affected the vision of the Iranian people towards reviving the nuclear agreement with the new Biden administration. According to ISPA, Iranian citizens were asked: To what outcome do you hope the nuclear deal talks will end? According to the results of the survey, 31.8% of the citizens said that they do not hope to conclude the JCPOA negotiations at all. 13.1% of them are slightly optimistic and 22.7% are moderately hopeful of reviving the nuclear deal. Only 15% of people have high or very high hopes for the conclusion of the nuclear deal negotiations. 17.5% did not answer this question (27).

The policy of maximum pressure, along with Rouhani's economic vision, which is confined to the West, prompted the dominant conservative current to change that view and talk about the economy of resistance that relies on local production and self-sufficiency.

For example, more than two-thirds (69 percent) of respondents in a University of Maryland poll said Iran should strive for economic sufficiency rather than increased trade, while only about half (53 percent) took this position in July 2014, when negotiations were underway to reach the nuclear agreement (28).

With the noose tightening on Tehran, Tehran is heading towards other markets. Iran obtained permanent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in September 2021. Although the process of activating this membership takes up to a year and a half (according to Dr. Fatima Al-Samadi)(29), this membership is considered a symbol of a major victory for a modern government. Childbirth, which did not pass more than two months after her birth. By proposing the formation of the Energy Club of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Iran seeks to open the door to joining the organization and playing a role in the challenging energy market, as well as crossing the fence of Western economic sanctions against the Iranian energy sector (30). Iran's accession to the Shanghai Organization also provides an important presence in regional and international equations, in addition to cooperation in the banking sector, and secures expansion and access to the energy market (31).

The failure of Rouhani's experience with the West prompted Tehran to promote the policy of turning towards the East, which is an effective policy, provided that this approach is not limited to China. Agreements with the Western bloc, Russia, India, southern neighbors and other regional and economic powers should be activated (32). If Tehran wants to build a strong economic strategy, it must link with all countries of the world and move towards an open economy, and Tehran must follow the Chinese model in managing the conflict with the United States. Despite the many arenas of economic, political and military conflict, the United States and China are in constant communication. On the other hand, Tehran should not forget that Chinese companies quit investing in Iranian oil projects immediately after the United States threatened to impose economic sanctions on any company that cooperates with Tehran. The most prominent example of these companies is CNBC, which withdrew from the contract. Development of phase 11 of the huge South Pars field. Likewise, the company itself withdrew from the contract signed with the Iranian government to develop the “Azadghan” field (33).

1.3. The elimination of the middle class capable of change.

In the 15 years preceding Obama's 2011 sanctions, sustained economic growth doubled GDP per capita and lifted millions out of poverty and into the middle class. This shift was a product of market-based reforms after the end of the war with Iraq, rural-biased public investment in infrastructure, education and health, and the high oil prices of the 2000s.

During the same period, survey data shows that average living standards in urban areas, home to the middle class, have more than doubled. According to a widely accepted income threshold (per capita spending above $11 purchasing power parity, or twice the World Bank poverty line of $5.5 for upper-middle-income countries). Iran's middle class during this period grew rapidly from 28 percent to 60 percent of the population, the majority rising from the ranks of the poor, whose share fell from 33 percent to 7 percent (lower middle class fell from 38 to 32 percent and doubled The highest income is from 1 to 2 percent) (34).

Although the UN and Obama sanctions on the oil and banking sectors under Ahmadinejad did not weaken the Islamist-dominated government, they weakened the middle class again and made it overwhelmed by the needs of survival, along with the policy of economic support and tension with society The international community tended towards the marginalization of the political power (35).

Rouhani's rise came as a result of a mixture of a number of factors, the most important of which is that Obama's public policy did not call for the overthrow of the regime, but rather was in order to put pressure on him to sit at the negotiating table. The political and economic marginalization experienced by the middle class after the events of the Green Movement, in 2009, also contributed. broad spiritual support; Promises of negotiations and lifting of sanctions prompted the middle class to move to support this trend in an attempt to return to the country's political scene. The stable conditions in the country have enabled the political middle class to draw the lines of trade and economy in the country, and this is what contributed to Rouhani's re-election again in 2017, with a greater percentage than in 2013 (36). Trump's policy has destroyed the middle class and its marginalization, so that the vast majority are from the lower middle class, which today is looking for sources of income and achieving the minimum necessary to live, which has clearly excluded it from the political scene in Iran, whether in the parliamentary elections or the presidential elections that Iran witnessed, as we mentioned above , a decrease in the number of people participating in the vote.

On the contrary, the money of the wealthy class has increased and their wealth has expanded at the expense of the poor with limited income. Forbes magazine recently published a report on the staggering increase in the number of “Iranian millionaires” which coincides with the general decline in income levels in Iran. Indeed, in Iran there is now a very small class of the "ultra rich" and a very large class of the "absolute poor".

According to the magazine, in 2020, the number of ultra-high-net-worth individuals in Iran increased by 21.6%, while the average growth of this group of ultra-wealthy people in the world in the same period was only 6.3%(37).

The middle class today is also witnessing internal pressures from conservatism, the trend that views technological progress as a threat to national security and thus tends to restrict it. Members of the Iranian parliament approved the cyberspace protection law, which targets, in one way or another, the middle class, which has more than two million job opportunities linked to the Internet. We believe that it is not too late to restore this class and restore its pivotal role in changing the political landscape in Iran and pushing the globalization of Iran more and more.

1.4. The direct correlation between the violence in the Gulf waters and the increase in pressure on Tehran.

There seems to be a direct correlation between the intensification of pressure on Tehran and the tanker war in the Gulf waters during the period between the announcement of the joint statement of the countries in the negotiations on the nuclear agreement in Lausanne on April 2, 2015, until May 12, 2019; The Gulf waters did not witness any military operations against oil tankers or merchant ships during this period (38). The dilemma began with US President Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018. Then the United States imposed harsh sanctions on Iran. President Trump and his administration did not clarify the legal reasons for this withdrawal, and contented themselves with general descriptions that “have no legal effect” on the agreement, describing it as the worst deal signed by his country. From a legal point of view, the International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran adhered to the provisions of the comprehensive action plan without violating it until November 11, 2019 (39), which is nearly 18 months since the withdrawal of the United States.

In the following table is a brief history of ship warfare in the Arabian Gulf waters from 2002 to the present.

What the data in the above table shows is that the stage of compliance with the nuclear agreement witnessed complete calm in the Gulf waters. With the exception of the seizure of two American boats carried out by Iranian military forces (which were released within less than 24 hours), the region did not witness any attack against oil tankers or merchant ships. After the imposition of maximum sanctions, the Gulf waters witnessed numerous attacks against oil tankers, and this region turned into a hot shadow war arena between Israel and Iran. In these shadow wars, both sides deliberately hit ships without sinking them, just as they deliberately did not target human crews. Most of the operations were carried out by laying mines on the sides of ships or through guided missiles. However, the recent attack on the Israeli "Mercer Street" ship differed in terms of intensity, as it sought to take lives, and also differed in terms of the means. This time, there is talk of an Iranian-made drone that carried out a suicide attack against the merchant ship. This is the first time that Iranian forces have used this type of means. This, if anything, indicates that Iranian drones have firmly entered the Iranian military system (46). As a summary, we notice a direct correlation between the tightening of sanctions and attacks against ships in international and Gulf waters. Even during the period between 2002 and 2014, the region witnessed only three cases, most of which were Israeli interceptions of Iranian ships loaded with weapons (that is, there were no mutual attacks), but the more they intensified. Sanctions against Tehran intensified military attacks against commercial ships and oil tankers.

As for the increase in domestic violence, the impact of US sanctions was reflected on the income sources of the Iranian government, and with the decline in Iranian oil revenues, the Rouhani government turned to other alternatives, most of which focused on taxes and raising gasoline prices. The government's decision to triple the price of petrol led poor demonstrators to the streets to protest. What characterizes these protests is the mutual violence between protesters and police forces. There is not a single reliable statistic on the number of victims among the police forces and demonstrators, or even about the public and private property that was vandalized during these demonstrations. But what is certain is the high rate of violence during these demonstrations, so that the director in charge of the fundamentalist newspaper Jawan, which is close to the Revolutionary Guards, described it as the most violent since the victory of the revolution, and Abdullah Ganji says: The death toll is certainly more than the number of those killed in the events of the Green Movement. In the year 2009(47).

2. Points of contention from an Iranian perspective

After Tehran rejected the IAEA's request to install cameras at the Karaj site, it became clear that any agreements reached between the agency and Tehran are interim political agreements outside the framework of the joint action plan and are part of the efforts Tehran to prevent the issuance of a decision against it in the Agency's Board of Governors.

With the advent of the Biden administration, some expected a smooth return to the nuclear agreement, but the issue of who will take the first step on the one hand, and the indirect negotiations between the United States and Tehran in Vienna and the suspension of negotiations until the new Iranian government stabilizes on the other hand, made the Iranian nuclear file suspended in the air.

Although the Biden administration claims that it has a strategy to deal with the Tehran nuclear file, the reality indicates the exact opposite. The administration was very reluctant to show good faith after Trump's unilateral withdrawal. The administration did not take practical steps to ease the atmosphere with Iran, especially in the issue of giving the green light to Japan, South Korea and Iraq to pay their debts owed to Iran, which amount to approximately $10 billion, which was later demanded by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abdollahian, as a gesture of goodwill from the United States. United. The administration did not move in the humanitarian file to lift some sanctions related to the health sector or allow Tehran to import medical equipment outside the framework of the sanctions or through frozen Iranian funds. It seems that the administration is continuing its policy of maximum pressure (its effect has been criticized in the past); Reuters published a report on a US request from China to reduce Iranian oil imports to force Tehran to return to the negotiating table (48).

Vali Nasr and Seyyed Hossein Mousavian talked about that separating Iran's regional interference file from the Iranian nuclear file may help advance negotiations between Tehran and other powers and may contribute to reviving the joint action plan (49). However, this argument does not provide a complete picture of the current situation. Where we see that the file of Iran's regional interference is not one of the main reasons for the divergence of views between the negotiating powers. As the issue of regional intervention has been overlooked since the beginning of the signing of the nuclear agreement (according to Nasr himself), because the Obama administration and his negotiating team (most of whom are today in the Biden negotiating team) believed that the completion of the nuclear deal might open prospects for reaching a second and third agreement on the role regional and Iranian missile programme.

Tehran took its time after the stability of Raisi's government to discuss all files and previous negotiations, but its justification for returning to the negotiating table is due to a group of reasons that we are discussing successively.

2.1. Guarantees not to withdraw again

One of the pivotal issues that made the negotiations extend to six rounds, and thus made the Iranians procrastinate in returning to Vienna, is Article 37 of the nuclear agreement; As the nuclear agreement, as a legal contract or an agreement between multiple parties, includes in its clauses a mechanism for resolving the dispute between the contracting parties in the event that one of the parties feels that the other contracting party has breached its commitment. The dispute resolution mechanism in the nuclear agreement did not deviate from what is familiar in its first part. It includes references to litigation and complaints (Joint Committee, Advisory Board and Security Council) and includes time limits for the parties to reach their legitimate rights within a reasonable period of time. The dilemma begins in the final section of the dispute resolution mechanism, which decides that if the disputing parties do not agree, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, votes on a resolution to continue lifting the sanctions. This is called the trigger mechanism. It is sufficient for any member participating in the nuclear agreement to vote no, in order for all UN sanctions to be reimposed on Iran.

This mechanism was called for by the Trump administration, but the Security Council did not vote to continue lifting the sanctions because the United States was not a participating member of the nuclear agreement at the time. After this long introduction, it must be said that the first thing that Iran fears and that pushes it to hesitate to return to negotiations is that the United States will return to become a member of the nuclear agreement again, and therefore it has the right to activate the trigger mechanism without the need to show any legitimate reasons for violating the agreement, and that is that the provisions of the mechanism for dissolving The dispute allows the complaining party, in a technical way, to ignore any decisions issued by the Advisory Council or the Joint Committee after the expiration of the specified deadlines, and to go to the Security Council and ask the opposite question about continuing to lift sanctions on Iran (50).

This mechanism has not been contested inside Iran because Iran sheds light on the positive points of the nuclear deal and considers it the basis for lifting economic sanctions on Iran. This mainly contributed to the re-election of Hassan Rouhani again in 2017. The discussions of Khamenei and Rafsanjani, which were recently leaked, refer to the media and government work by the Rouhani government to highlight the positive side and neglect the concessions made by the Rouhani government and his negotiating team during the negotiation process.

2.2. The dispute over the concept of abolishing sanctions and verifying that

The other contentious issue is the disagreement over the concept of “abolition of all penalties.” What Tehran is calling for is the cancellation of any sanctions imposed after the signing of the nuclear agreement. These demands were made by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the former Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, the current Foreign Minister, Amir Abdullahian, and the Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi. This means canceling the sanctions related to the arms embargo imposed on Iran by the United States unilaterally, canceling the sanctions related to the human rights file, canceling the individual sanctions imposed on members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Iranian political and military figures, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, and canceling the designation of the Revolutionary Guard. Iran as a terrorist organization, in addition to canceling all sanctions related to the nuclear file. According to the Islamic Consultative Council Studies Center, Tehran views keeping the sanctions unrelated to the nuclear file as a factor of pressure against Iran to engage in future negotiations that include the missile program and Iran's regional role, while the Biden administration views this cancellation as only including sanctions related to Iranian nuclear activities. According to Robert Malley in an interview with Judy Woodruff in April 2021 (51); As there is no common nature of these sanctions that bring them together in order to cancel them at once, not to mention the legislative difficulties that the administration will face before Congress because some of the sanctions were approved under the dome of the US Congress.

2.3. Practical verification mechanism for lifting sanctions

In addition to all this, there is the condition for verifying the lifting of sanctions, a mechanism added by Khamenei to the terms of renegotiation with the United States and Western powers, and confirmed by the Islamic Consultative Council in Article 7 of the Strategic Action Law to lift sanctions and protect the interests of the Iranian nation, and this mechanism means that Tehran will not fully implement the nuclear agreement until after a complete lifting of sanctions, in addition to a certain period of time (mostly three months) to verify the reality of this lifting in practice.

Recently, the Center for Studies of the Iranian Islamic Shura Council published a report in which it clarified the mechanism for verifying the effectiveness of lifting sanctions and its main axes, in addition to the implementation dimensions of this mechanism. The Center for Studies stresses that the lifting of sanctions should be one of the main and inevitable demands of the country's foreign policy apparatus in any future negotiation process. In other words, the lifting of sanctions on Iran, regardless of the legal dimension (lifting the sanctions on paper), must require a real benefit to the Iranian economy in terms of lifting the sanctions. Verification is an ongoing activity in which a regulatory body evaluates the compliance of the other party with the provisions of the agreement based on objective indicators and criteria related to the type of obligations.

The verification body can be a multi-faceted body such as the Supreme National Security Council, the Supreme Oversight Authority, or even a new body with strong expertise and a permanent secretariat. The Council's position entrusts this body with three main tasks: 1) Monitoring and analyzing the level of benefit of the Iranian economy in terms of lifting sanctions. 2) Enabling the receipt of complaints from any Iranian citizen or institution (especially those individuals and institutions who were removed from the sanctions list) on topics of “violating the terms of the nuclear agreement or the inability to benefit from the lifting of sanctions.” 3) Developing a regulation to reduce commitments to the nuclear agreement and implementing its provisions in proportion to the non-compliance of the other side by formulating a regulation to stop, suspend or reduce nuclear obligations (52).

The Council's Studies Center divides the list of verification of the lifting of sanctions into two parts:

Continuity Checklist for Lifting Sanctions and Issuing Periodic Authorizations for Further Implementation of Iran's Measures in the JCPOA (Periodic Checks): For continued verification, it is recommended that Iran's economy benefit from the continued lifting of sanctions. Test and publish reports quarterly. 2.5 million barrels per day of oil exports, at least $4.2 billion per month in transactions in favor of Iranian individuals and entities at the German EIH Bank and at least $1.5 billion at the Commercial Bank of Paris are the thresholds for the first axis of continuous verification (54).

This process can take months and is very complex; As the effect of lifting sanctions appears in the desire and return of international private companies to invest in Iran. These companies first need a safe and stable environment, and then they need Western-American guarantees not to prejudice their interests or impose future sanctions on them if they cooperate with Tehran. Neither Western countries nor the United States have the means to put pressure on these independent companies to enter the Iranian market.

3. Drawing Iran's Nuclear Policy

Since the operation of Iran's nuclear reactors, Tehran's tendency towards uranium enrichment, and the entry of Western parties into the line of preventing Tehran from reaching a nuclear weapon, three internal Iranian theories emerged on how to deal with the nuclear file.

Both saw high enrichment; And dealing on the principle of win-win, roles during the past years, and the theory of effective deterrence (acquiring nuclear weapons first and then negotiation) did not find its way into practical reality, and its existence was limited to academic theorizing and some statements by some Iranian officials, due to the categorical rejection by the Supreme Leader Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for possessing nuclear weapons and his repeated fatwas that possession of nuclear weapons is forbidden from the legal point of view (55).

3.1. The theory of high enrichment in exchange for more privileges

This team is headed by Saeed Jalili, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council. Jalili is considered one of the pillars of the shadow state in Iran. Jalili likens Iranian diplomacy to Iranian carpets, as he believes: “The work of diplomacy is like Iranian carpets; It moves forward a millimeter, in a precise and orderly manner, but in the end, God willing, it will be beautiful and permanent” (56). This was Jalili's response to a question about the reason for the long period of time that negotiations with the major powers took in 2008. Jalili reinforces his vision of the marathon negotiations by saying that the long-term negotiations are not a mistake; There are currently talks between the United States and some countries that have lasted more than 20 years (57).

Jalili assumed the position of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in October 2007, after the resignation of Ali Larijani. Since Ahmadinejad took office in the ninth government, tensions over Iran's nuclear program have increased. In March 2005, the Iran issue was referred from the Board of Governors to the United Nations Security Council. By the time Jalili chaired the talks, China and Russia, along with three Western countries, had passed three Security Council resolutions against Iran, and international sanctions on nuclear activities had officially begun, but the sanctions mostly targeted nuclear activities and weapons.

Jalili resumed nuclear talks with Javier Solana, European Union foreign policy chief. Negotiations faced long delays during Jalili's reign. But these interruptions in the talks did not prevent the Security Council from imposing sanctions on Iran. Resolution 1803 was approved by a vote of 14 member states in March 2007. The decision to impose sanctions went beyond nuclear activities, targeted trade with Iran and posed a major commercial risk to Iran at the time (58).

In September 2009, another round of talks was held in Geneva, with William Burns representing the United States. The US State Department confirmed that William Burns met Saeed Jalili on the sidelines of the Geneva summit. These were the first formal, direct talks between a high-ranking Iranian official and an American official in 30 years. The meeting took place when Barack Obama became President of the United States (59).

Jalili believes that increasing uranium enrichment to high levels will strengthen Iran's position in the negotiations and push the US to lift the sanctions completely. This doctrine has been met with harsh criticism even from the far right of the fundamentalists in Iran. Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, fiercely challenged Saeed Jalili during the 2013 election debates; He said: “Diplomacy is not about making speeches in other countries and repeating press releases in front of us here. In the recent “Almaty”(60) talks, suggestions were made that could be followed, but Mr. Jalili did not accept them. They said in the Almaty talks that if enrichment and the Fordow reactor are slowed down, we will lift three UN sanctions. But you said the whole ban should be lifted, which shows that you don't want to go any further. Diplomacy does not mean at home that we are fundamentalists and do not have flexibility. Diplomacy does not show violence and stubbornness. Diplomacy is interaction and barter. They cannot give what we want and do nothing in return! Diplomacy is not a statement from behind the podium!” (61).

The dismissal of Araghchi from heading the negotiating delegation and bringing in Bagheri Kani comes in the context of the predominance of this team's vision. Bagheri Kani served as Jalili's assistant in the Supreme National Security Council in addition to being a member of the nuclear negotiations under Jalili and led Jalili's presidential campaign in the 2013 elections.

Baqeri Kani says during an interview with the “Dest Line” program: “The situation of the Europeans is clear, but I was surprised by some people at home who really want to whiten the face of the Europeans all the time. The Europeans are an extension of the Americans in imposing sanctions.” Kanni more than once expressed his personal belief that the nuclear deal was never the regime's decision. He told Tasnim News Agency: “I am now expressing my personal opinion, if we mean by the regime, the supreme leader, the leader imposed 11 conditions during the period of negotiations that took place since the Rouhani government took over until the agreement was reached. The guide had a series of red lines, basic lines that delineate clear boundaries for the frameworks for negotiations. The majority of these terms have not been complied with. The guide said that the negotiating delegation should not give up the rights of the Iranian nation, especially the nuclear rights, but more than 100 cases of the Iranian nation's rights were wasted in the nuclear agreement. Bagheri Kani promotes the theory that when the centrifuges work so will the economy (62).

Iranian Economy News analyzed the current scene of stalled negotiations; Where she wrote in her analysis: The government of Ibrahim Raisi does not believe in the negative impact of the passage of time on the agreement. On the contrary, it believes that the passage of time strengthens Iran's hand in the negotiations. As if the presidential government also returned to Saeed Jalili's tactics during the nuclear talks in Ahmadinejad's government.

At that time, with the start of 20% enrichment, Iran thought it would have leverage in the negotiations, but the truth is that this leverage (i.e. 20% enrichment) was never in favor of Iran during Saeed Jalili's negotiations. So far, it seems that the government of Ibrahim Raisi intends to put pressure on the United States by increasing its uranium reserves by 20% and 60%, as well as restricting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. But the government should be careful, because this approach can also act as a double-edged sword. In this way, the United States will have the opportunity to become more coordinated with its European allies and to exert more coordinated pressure on Iran (63).

3.2. Win-win negotiation theory

After the failure of the negotiating man for the sake of negotiation, Saeed Jalili (as described by Iqtisad News), to stop the sanctions, a different voice appeared in the file of dealing with the United States. This team is led by the former president, Hassan Rouhani. Although Rouhani is described as a moderate, the truth is that Rouhani came from the heart of the right and changed his positions based on the needs of the regime. Rouhani was a member of the Association of Mubarizin clerics of the Iranian right in 1987, but in 1999, before the sixth parliamentary elections, he formed a reformist party called Modesty and Development and personally took over the leadership of the party.

The vision of this team is based on the importance of realistic dealing with the nuclear file and the necessity of direct involvement in negotiations between Iran and the superpowers. Hassan Rouhani was appointed as the representative of the Supreme Leader in the Supreme National Security Council, on November 13, 1989. Since 1989, he has been responsible for the secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council for 16 years, a position he held in Hashemi Rafsanjani's government and continued into the presidency of Sayyid Mohammad Khatami . The vision of this team, led by Rouhani, was refined through its work on the nuclear file in 2004, when it became responsible for the technical and legal file of the Iranian nuclear program after the Atomic Energy Organization issued a strongly worded statement against Iran, followed by another decision by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Hassan Rouhani believes in a developmental government. A government that seeks political and economic development by developing constructive relations with the world. Hassan Rouhani's perception of the global situation is that he considers cooperation on the world stage to be reasonable despite all the problems facing it. Hassan Rouhani's worldview and perception is more than just idealism based on realism. Rouhani believes that our view of the world and its issues should be characterized by moderation and moderation, and he said: “Moderation does not mean surrender, calm, negativity, or confrontation, but solving problems is not possible through isolation. Our approach is constructive interaction. We seek to build trust and transparency. Our focus is on peaceful coexistence and cooperation” (64).

The vision of Rouhani's team, consisting of the former foreign minister, Javad Zarif, and his assistant, Abbas Araghchi, is based on three goals:

1- Reaching an agreement between Iran and the superpowers based on the win-win principle through which the parties achieve the desired goals by making concessions and obtaining concessions.

2- Developing the Iranian nuclear program and turning it into a legitimate program from the point of view of the Security Council, and creating an economic vision in the nuclear program. These goals will be achieved within 10 or 15 years.

3- Lifting the sanctions imposed on Iran in exchange for legitimate enrichment (65).

3.3. effective deterrence theory

Asgarkhani is considered the founder of this theory, which is considered one of the most radical theories in Iranian circles. Asgarkhani's theory is based on the theory of effective deterrence. Deterrence, according to Askarkhani, is a military concept, and it comes to mind to use the military threat to persuade the opponent not to attack, and therefore if the force is concentrated, it leads to stability and the collapse of the force leads to systematic instability (66). This concept attracted the attention of military strategists mainly after the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1940s by the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) (67).

Asgarkhani claims that, contrary to the goals promoted by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the impact of these treaties seemed limited to some private resources that were used politically. On the contrary, the proliferation of nuclear weapons did not stop, nor did their tests stop (68).

Some believe that nuclear disarmament and related treaties are desirable if applied to all. If the nuclear arsenals were dismantled all over the world without discrimination, and arms races were stopped, and if the regimes were able to remove the elements of fear, selfishness, and self-interest and benefit from the nature of human beings, states and governments, then it can be said that there is no need for that armament (69). But despite disarmament treaties, nuclear weapons have proliferated and now governments other than the five Security Council nations have acquired nuclear weapons, usually at the whim of and sometimes condoned by the great powers calling for nuclear disarmament. This has prompted many countries to try to stand on their own in the military field, because they have found that only after arming one can speak of restraint and expect others to do the same, rather than disarming themselves in the face of potential and actual competitors. And only then do these countries not expect others not to use their deadly weapons through moral advice. The acquisition of a great power may motivate governments to go to war (70).

This group defines Iranian military power as being defensive, not offensive; As the security and weapons strategy of each country is a response to the threats of the security environment and its basic objectives. Regional crises and threats have created new geopolitical conflicts. The goal of Iran's foreign policy and armaments strategy was based on two main goals: “achieving security (national and regional)” and “development and progress.” On the other hand, the organization of foreign policy and regional strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been influenced by two factors: geopolitical realities and ideological orientations. The geopolitical element has always influenced the ideological element in the direction of Iran's security and military policy in the region. In the wake of the arms embargo and continued US efforts to isolate Iran, Iran has shifted its orientation toward self-sufficiency and increasing military equipment in line with defensive rather than offensive purposes. Direct regional and trans-regional threats have always increased security risks in Iran and diminished regional benefits. However, the “doctrine” of defending the country is based on non-offensive defense (71).

Asgarkhani criticizes the regime's wholesale policy with regard to the nuclear file, as he criticizes Ahmadinejad's reasoning on the issue of nuclear weapons and calls for a public nuclear test to be conducted as soon as possible, so that Iran's presence is registered in the club of nuclear governments, such as India and Pakistan. Regarding the cost of this option, he says that the costs will certainly be high, but ensuring the survival and territorial integrity of Iran is worth the cost. In fact, besides the temporary suffering of Iranians at this historical juncture, he envisions a future in which he believes that the atomic bomb can guarantee Iran's security and identity in the face of external dangers (72).

Finally, Asgarkhani blames all Iranian governments and negotiating teams for the nuclear issue, and says: “The (Geneva) agreement has placed a much greater burden on the Iranian people than the Jalili negotiations. Jalili's negotiations have placed a much greater burden on the Iranian people than Mr. Larijani. Likewise, Mr. Larijani has imposed a much heavier burden on the country than Rouhani. Rouhani, in turn, placed a burden much heavier than that of the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on the Iranian people. This means that this process is a series of interconnected errors. This trend continues to escalate, and negotiation, instead of helping us, is drowning us in more whirlpools (73).

3.4. The theory adopted by the system today

The regime in Iran has not yet reached the choice of the theory of effective deterrence or the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence. However, realistic indications indicate that the regime chose to raise the enrichment ceiling to obtain more privileges, or at least to change the unfair clauses from its point of view. The regime chose Jalili's theory in its part related to raising enrichment to obtain more privileges, but it did not take its second part, which calls for procrastination and negotiation just for the sake of negotiation. Rather, the regime added the element of the process to its political discourse, and this means that it is in a hurry and is ready to negotiate if these negotiations will bear fruit. .

The fact that the political officials in Iran did not declare the adoption of Asgarkhani's deterrence theory does not mean that it is not popular in Iran. It must be said that an Iranian academic study in the field of defense or security is not devoid of the name of Asgarkhani and the theory of effective deterrence that he laid down its foundations. As for the political circles, a slip of the tongue (intentionally or unintentionally) by the Iranian Minister of Intelligence during Rouhani’s era, Sayyed “Mohammed Alavi”, indicated the existence of such an option in the Iranian political imagination. Alavi said in an interview with Iran’s Channel 2: “The Supreme Leader stated in his fatwa that the production of nuclear weapons is against Sharia and the Islamic Republic does not comply with that and considers it forbidden, but if a cat is thrown into a corner, it may behave in a way that a free cat does not.” 74).

It seems that if the negotiations reach a dead end, the regime will turn to the latest solution that has not been tried before, which is the manufacture of nuclear weapons to achieve deterrence.

Summaries